Regardless of whether or not the Kyoto Protocol enters into force, the EU may decide to set itself a long-term greenhouse gas emission target and thus to continue its leadership role in international climate policy. As for the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, the EU may decide on a burden-sharing agreement as an integral part of such a long-term climate policy. Against this background I analyse three different options to distribute an overall budget of emission entitlements until 2042 among the member states of an enlarged EU. It is shown who wins and who loses with regard to compliance costs. As the member states' attitudes towards the different approaches are likely to depend on the relative attractiveness of the allocation options, a relevance threshold is introduced which may help to predict and understand the complexity of future climate negotiations in Europe.
Introduction
The EU has been perceived / described as leader in the context of international climate policy. The implementation of an EU-wide emission trading scheme on installation level (EU 2003) may serve as the latest proof. Consequently, it may also set itself an (ambitious) emission target for the time after 2012, i.e. when the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol ends. This target setting may of course take place in the context of the negotiations in the framework of the United Nations Framework Conventions on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as well as in a European framework only in case the Kyoto Protocol does not enter into force. 1 An EU-wide target may then be symmetrically broken down to each member state (MS), i.e. a uniform reduction rate would apply for all MS. Alternatively, a differentiated agreement as it has been reached among member states for the first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol could also be agreed upon. Both approaches offer advantages and disadvantages (for a discussion see for example Ringius 1997).
Against this background I analyse three different burden sharing rules, namely an allocation based on equal emissions per capita, on equal emissions per capita over time and based on the sovereignty principle.
During the analysis I assume that, regardless of the option chosen, emission trading is always possible. Thus, member states are not required to meet the emission targets through national measures only. They can rather buy emission rights 2 on the market in case they are cheaper than national actions. Provided this market is competitive and neglecting transaction costs, allocating a total EU budget differently among member states does not affect the overall efficiency of the trading scheme 3 . It is rather a distributional issue as the member states compliance costs' may be affected. As the absolute costs implications over such a long period are difficult to quantify, a qualitative analysis is provided instead. This analysis then forms the basis for an investigation of the consequences for the political bargaining process.
As the EU will see ten new members in Mai 2004 these should also be considered in any analysis of future European climate policy, especially when focussing on burden sharing rules. This aspect has been neglected so far. However, as Bulgaria and Romania may also be members of the EU in 2013, they are included in the following analysis, too.
1 Agreements between like-minded countries may generally, i.e. not only in Europe, emerge instead of a global consensus (Sugiyama 2003) . 2 The terms emission allowance, entitlement and right are used equivalently throughout this paper. 3 With regard to an allocation to entities within member states as for example describe in the EU directive on Emissions trading (EU 2003) , different options do matter. See for example Burtraw et al. (2001) and Burtraw et al. (2002) .
The paper is structured as follows. The next section briefly discusses some aspects of justice principles. Section three reviews the burden sharing for the period 2008 to 2012 with a focus on the EU. Section four shortly describes some aspects for post 2012 commitment on the global level before the focus is again on the European level in the section that follows. Section 6 concludes.
Climate policy, burden sharing and justice principles
When the signs of a changing climate due to human activity became clearer at the end of the eighties of the last century, a discussion on sharing the burden of limiting GHG emission started, too (d'Arge 1989 , Rose 1990 . Since then, different sets of justice principles, which imply certain allocations, have been presented (and applied). Some of them are quite similar, though they are called by different names. Rose (1992) for example discusses ten different principles which later have been distinguished with regard to whether a "criterion applies to the process by which a criterion is chosen, the initial allocation of allowances, or to be the final outcome of the implementation of the policy instrument..." (Rose et al. 1998 The principles have mostly been considered in the global discussion, i.e. in a burden sharing between industrialised and developing countries. However, when applying them for allocations of emission entitlements two major problems arise: Firstly, the different principles are in most cases equally justified. This is to say that one cannot decide which principle is to be preferred in case there are different opinions. The views on industrialised and developing countries are quite contrary. 4 To overcome this problem, Müller (2001) proposes the so-called preference score method to reach a "compromise-solution" between different principles or approaches, as discussed below. Secondly, apart from the principle, a reference base, e.g. population, as well as an operational rule for applying the principle, e.g. allocate in proportion to population, is required (Rose 1992). However, "there is no one-to-one relation between a fairness principle and a specific formula, meaning that one formula can be supported by more than one principle, and one principle can support more than one formula" (Torvanger et al.
p. 15).
Regardless of these theoretical considerations agreements on burden sharing for the period up to 2012 have been reached. On the global level the distinction between Annex I and nonAnnex I countries in the UNFCCC as well as the distinction between Annex B and nonAnnex B countries in the Kyoto Protocol can be mentioned. The latter is described in more detail in the next section. Another example is the European burden-sharing agreement which was reached in 1998. It is also further analysed below. Source: Torvanger et al. (1999) Finally, at the third Conference of Parties the Kyoto Protocol was adopted which sets differentiated, binding emission targets for most of the OECD countries. On average, a reduction of 5.2 % compared to 1990 was agreed upon. It is interesting to note that there has been no "principled logic" (Babiker et al. 2002, p. 411) for the determination of the emission targets. They are rather the outcome of a political bargaining process with limited time (Torvanger et al. 1999 p. 13, Grubb et al. 1999 . The targets are listed in Table 8 
The European level 3.2.1 The burden sharing for the first commitment period
Having an emission target for the EU as whole and subsequently differentiate the commitments between member states has been a guiding idea for the European climate police early in the 1990s. The rationale was to allow cohesion countries 7 to increase emissions while the richer ones in the North would reduce them. In 1991 the Commission proposed a burden sharing with the following three levels: -5 % for Denmark, Germany and The Netherlands, + 15 % for the cohesion countries and stabilisation for the rest. However, it was rejected by several countries and thus not pursued any further. Only in the run-up to the Kyoto Protocol and the negotiations on binding targets did the discussion on the burden-sharing re-start. A new proposal by the Commission which foresaw a 10 % reduction for 2005, however, was not approved. Only when the Dutch presidency commissioned a study by some experts from The
Netherlands did the BSA negotiations really got ahead (Michaelowa et al. 2001, p. 268) .
The so-called Triptych approach (Phylipsen et al. 1998) , developed by these experts, distinguishes between three sectors for each of which a target was defined. Theses targets 5 Apart from the bubble three other flexible mechanisms were introduced that shall allow a cost-efficient meeting of the targets. This is international emissions trading (Art. 17) and the two project-based mechanisms joint implementation (JI, Art. 6) and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM, Art. 12).
were, however, not meant to be sector targets, but rather the basis for the national targets. The underlying idea was to find a compromise between a simple symmetrical approach which was judged to be political unacceptable on the one hand and differentiated but complex and intransparent agreements on the other hand.
The three sectors are: domestic (households, light industry and agriculture) energy intensive, export-orientated industry and electricity generation. For the domestic sector emissions per capita were to converge in all member states by 2030 at level 30 % below the EU 1990 level.
Climatic aspects in the different countries have been considered. For the energy intensive, export-orientated industry sector an annual increase in energy efficiency by 1.2 and 1.5 % per year between was assumed. Production growth rate was assumed to be 1.1 and 2.1 %. For the energy sector an increase in demand of 1.9 % and 1 % was assumed for the cohesion countries and the other respectively. However, a tailor-made approach combining a countryto-country approach and general guidelines was followed to determine the electricity sector's final allowances (Ringius 1997).
The first proposal of early 1997 had been passed through several negotiations before a final agreement was reached in March of the same year. The latest negotiation result included methane and nitrous oxide, too (Phylipsen et al. 1998, p. 939) . After the Kyoto Protocol had been adapted the agreement had to be renegotiated due to the inclusion of three more gases and a lower target for the EU (Michaelowa et al. 2001, p. 269) . Table 2 provides an overview on the evolution of the first BSA. EU Council (1998) As mentioned the rational behind the Triptych approach was to offer an acceptable compromise. The evaluation of the burden sharing agreement, however, depends on criteria considered while judging. And the closer the agreement is coming to be effective, the higher is the opposition. Only recently did the Spanish employers' federation CEOE urge Madrid to renegotiate the burden-sharing deal as "Spain miscalculated emissions levels when it signed up" (PointCarbon 2003). Table 3 gives some examples for selected criteria. As one can see, the burden already changes when the factual reduction obligation, i.e. the difference between baseline emissions and the emission target without any additional climate policy, is calculated (second column). The economic effects are shown in the next two columns. Again, effects differ strongly among member states and are not related to the 1998 agreement. For example, while the minus 12.5 % target of the UK seems rather strict compared to the minus 6 % target of The Netherlands, the model calculations suggest that the economic implications are rather modest for the UK compared to those for The Netherlands. Differences between welfare and GNP changes are inter alia due to favourable changes in terms-of-trade patterns.
Also when looking at the marginal abatement costs in case the member states were to meet their targets by domestic action only, large differences are found 8 . Blok et al. (2001, p.27 
The EU bubble and the accession countries
As the EU member states have ratified the Protocol and submitted their corresponding documents to the UN, there is no possibility to include the accession countries joining in May 2004 in the EU bubble for the first commitment period. This would only be possible from 2013 onwards. As the accession countries have also ratified the Protocol there is no option for them to form a bubble of their own as suggested by Michaelowa et al. (2001, p. 277) . They also propose that the EU and the accession countries could form an implicit strategic bubble to co-ordinate sale of emission rights and JI projects. The latter aspect is discussed in more detail by Armenteros et al. (2003) .
Emission targets on the global level after 2012
As mentioned above the discussion on the contribution to limiting GHG emissions on the With regard to the European climate policy it goes without saying that the international negotiations may influence the European discussion (for example Aidt et al. 2002) . Indeed, most of the global approaches mentioned above imply a certain allocation for the single EU member states. However, this is not a must. The discussion of post 2012 emission targets within the EU does not necessarily require an agreement on the global level nor the ratification of the Kyoto Protocol. Setting a long-term emission target independently of the global discussion could rather put the EU in the position of the "directional leader 10 ". Finally, apart from any agreement reached on international level, EU member states can always decide to re-allocate emission entitlements among each other according to whatever rule they like to.
European burden sharing after 2012
In the run-up of the negotiations in Kyoto the EU-Council concluded that "…given the Council 1996) . The council's conclusion was recalled in 1997 adding that this "…calls for early action on emission reduction and indicates the need for significant reductions from industrialised countries in the 2000-2020 time-frame" (EU Council 1996).
Even though the two target figures of 550 ppm and a 2 degree Celsius increase seem quite clear, it is difficult to draw concrete emission targets from that. Apart from uncertainty in climate modelling the role of timing is of crucial importance. Nevertheless, some rough ideas are possible as for example shown in Table 4 . However, it is not straightforward to determine the European share of the pie. should remember that no allocation requires specific domestic emission reductions at any costs for any MS. There would always be the possibility to buy emission rights on the market.
Tab. 4: Stabilisation level and related allowable emissions
· September 1998: The European Parliament adopts a resolution on climate change that calls for global constitutional principles for the long-term management of global climate change using Contraction & Convergence. · October 1998: Tony Blair, UK Prime Minister, writes: "I agree that, in the fight against climate change (C&C) makes an important contribution to the debate on how we achieve long-term climate stability, taking into account the principles of equity and sustainability …" · April 1999: Svend Auken, Danish Environment Minister: "The approach 'Contraction & Convergence' is precisely such an idea. It secures a regime that would allow all nations to join efforts to protect our global commons from being over-exploited, without the risk that any country would be deprived of its fair long-term share of the common environmental emission space." · June 2000: Jan Pronk, Netherlands Environment Minister said that C&C is the most equitable, the cheapest and easiest and the most effective.
Given these statements one can quite reasonably imagine that an allocation within the European Community will take equal emissions per capita to a higher extend into account than in the Triptych approach. The sovereignty principle is included in the analysis as it offers a straightforward approach for sharing the burden.
For all analyses a "double fifty" approach is assumed, i.e. I assume that the EU sets itself a target of minus 50 % compared to the 1990 level. The target is to be met in 2042, i.e. 50 years after the Framework Convention was adopted in Rio de Janeiro. 12 Apart from environmental concerns industry, too, is likely to support long-term targets. This has become obvious in the recent discussion on the national allocation plans for the EU trading scheme. 13 For all cases I assume that the future commitment periods are of 5 years length which is by no means until 2012, the German proposal implies much stricter commitments by the other MS in the future. Furthermore, it was unclear whether EU 15 or an enlarged EU was considered. 12 There is no economically motivated rational behind this target. It is rather the two times 50 approach that might be adopted by policy makers which sometimes like simple figures. 13 This is especially true for those industries with long-living investment as in the power sector. In Germany for example, this long-term aspect has been on the agenda in top-level discussions among Chancellor Schröder and CEO from major utilities (Anonymous 2003) . The results for each commitment period until 2042 are given in Table 9 in the annex.
Cumulative emission rights for the period from 2013 to 2042 are shown in Table 5 .
Equal emissions per capita over time (EECT)
An allocation based on equal emissions over time has been proposed by Bode (2003) and was applied on a global level. However, it is also applicable in the European context. The rationale behind this approach as follows: With an allocation based on equal emissions per capita as analysed in the previous section, the distribution may be perceived as fair from the point when EEC are reached. Until this point is reached, however, they may differ considerably (see Figure 1a ). This is why it was proposed to allocate emissions entitlements in such a way that average emissions per capita in a period to be specified are also the same prior to the time when equal emission per capita are reached (hatched area in Figure 1b) 18 Later allocations could also be based on population data of the previous year(s) instead of relying on prognoses for the year considered. 19 In case one thinks that these changes imply to much uncertainty with regard to the allocation in a future year, one may consider to allocate on the basis of the member states' seats in the European Parliament which are based on population, too.
at per capita emissions in 2042 one cannot only say that the allocation is based on equity of rights in that year and later. One can also look back and see that average emissions per capita in different countries have already been the same for period considered. For the analysis below, the period is to start in 1992 the year the UNFCCC was adopted. Regarding the global discussion the approach allows for some interesting flexibility with regard to the start of entering an international agreement. 
where a, b, c coefficients, t = time, A allowable budget, D i describes the cumulative emissions per capita and year between 1992 and 2012 for member state i.
With the emissions per capita in 2012 and 2042 known for each member state, equation (1) can be solved.
22 20 As there is already a burden sharing agreement for the first commitment period the approach can only be applied from 2013 onwards. 21 There is no economical rational behind the specific form of the quadratic function. It is rather used to be able to shift the vertex as required by the country specific emission balance (see also Figure 1b As for the equal per capita approach the results for each commitment period until 2042 are given the Annex. Cumulative emission rights for the period from 2013 to 2042 are also shown in Table 5 .
Sovereignty principle
The basic idea of the Sovereignty principle is that "all nations have an equal right to pollute and to be protected from pollution." An operational rule would be to "cut back emissions in a proportional manner across all nations" (Rose et al. 1998, p. 30) . In the European context this means that all MS would have to reduce emissions by a uniform rate equal to the common target. The rationale behind this approach would be the idea of sovereign states with equal bargaining power negotiating over the allocation. The principle finally results in a protection of rights that have been established by usage or custom (Aidt et al. 2002, p. 13) . Inequalities regarding the release of GHG emissions would thus be perpetuated (Blanchard et al. 2001 ).
Regardless of any philosophical considerations, the sovereignty rule can be perceived as the simplest form of an allowances allocation (for example Schmidt et al. 1998 ) what makes it worth to analyse it. The results are given in Table 5 and Table 11 respectively.
Discussion
As turned out during the discussion of the 1998 burden sharing agreement there are different ways to analyse the "fairness" of allocation schemes. Table 5 summarises some important aspects. Column two to four show the member states' reduction obligation in 2042 compared to 1990 levels for the three approaches studied above. As can be seen, the individual allocation varies considerably depending on the approach while the total budget for the EU is always the same. However, this is only the specific outcome for the year 2042. From a member state's perspective the resulting cumulative emission entitlements are likely to be of the same importance. This is why the next three columns show the cumulative emission entitlements for the each MS for the period between 2013 and 2042, i.e. the period that can still be negotiated. To get an idea of the relative difference among the three approaches, column 8 shows the ratio between the minimum and the maximum allocation. A small figure indicates a high difference. As can be seen for most member states the number of allowances with an allocation based on equal emissions per capita lies between those of the two other approaches. Implications of the differences are discussed below.
Regarding EECT one should note that this approach would imply some bias as it would only be applied from 2013 on. Member states which are net allowance buying countries in the first commitment period will incur higher emissions compared to a no-trade or scenario. These higher emissions (per capita) would be deducted from the countries budget after 2012, although they would be in line with the rule during the first period. 
Cost implications of different allocation options
Different allocations of emission entitlements imply different compliance costs for the single member states. Compliance costs depend on the emission reduction obligation and the emission (reduction) costs. The reduction obligation to be considered before a certain commitment period has started is the difference of business as usual emissions less the entitlements distributed. 23 Compliance costs are the costs incurred due to domestic abatement plus the costs for the purchase of entitlements on the market. An exact quantification of the different compliance costs is out of the scope of this paper. Yet, one may question whether it is reasonable to do so for a period of more than 20 years. First of all the development of future emissions and thus reduction obligations is highly unclear. A great number of scenarios exist (see for example IPCC 2000; Zhang 2002 gives an overview on estimates on EU baseline emissions in 2010 that already differ by factor 2). Secondly, development of the future abatement costs for the time horizon considered costs are also highly uncertain. On the other hand some qualitative relations may be of interest.
Given the differences in cumulative emissions in the period 1992 to 2042, consider a one period game. Assuming a competitive market und neglecting transaction costs one would always, for a given EU emission target, expect the same allowance price within the EU market regardless of the allocation to the individual member state. 24 Only the member states' compliance costs may change. This change will depend on whether the country is a net-seller or net-buyer of entitlements.
The net-buyer's and seller's situation in a one period game is depicted in Figure 2 . Assuming a certain allocation option as a reference which results in a reduction obligation of q 1 , the buyer will reduce the quantity q * at home and buy the remaining entitlements q 1 -q * on the market at the equilibrium price p In case the number is higher the country has to reduce less and will realise a relative benefit B compared to the initial allocation amounting to: Figure 2a ) 23 In case banking of entitlements is allowed they also have to be considered. 24 In case the EU market is linked to other (regional) market the price may change depending on the stringency of emission targets in the other countries. While in case (2) the country only buys less allowances on the market it also benefits from selling entitlements in the third case (see area B in Figure 2a ).
For the selling country the situation is slightly different. Supposing it receives a bigger allocation it has to reduce less and can sell additional allowances resulting in an increased benefit B of (4) B = (q 1 -q
which equals area C in Figure 2b ). If it is allocated a smaller number of allowances compared to the reference allocation it incurs a relative loss L compared to the reference allocation amounting to:
In the last case the selling country would turn to a buying country.
Fig. 2: Impact of different reduction obligations on abatement and compliance costs
Against this background one can quantify the maximum relative losses L max due to a change of the burden sharing rule. 25 They occur when the reference allocation was the best possible one, i.e. q 1 = q s and amount to For the net-buyer this is obvious from (1) due to the fact that a buying country cannot benefit from any sale of allowances when its reduction obligation is increased. For the seller it can be derived from (5) and (6) when assuming that abatement cost for the reductions considered are zero. 26 Whether these maximum losses will be realised is discussible. In case of a relative stringent emission target abatement costs of zero are unlikely to occur, so that the relative losses for the sellers are likely to be smaller than the maximum.
Though the carbon price is highly uncertain Table 6 provides an overview on financial implications of a price of 10 EUR. As absolute figures may distort the picture, annual costs are put in relation with the member states' GDP in 2000. As additional costs have to be born by someone, annual costs per capita are also presented. Such indicators may be relevant for policy implication as will be discussed in the next section.
As can be seen in Table 6 the annual costs as percentage of GDP in 2000 are highest for the accession countries incl. Bulgaria and Romania. Obviously, for those countries there is much more at stake. At the other end of the range the UK and Austria face rather low differences in costs with these three allocation options.
Tab. 6: Implications of different allocation options at a carbon price of 10 EUR/t CO 2-eq
Allocation maximum (Mio. t) Table 5 5
.4.2 Policy implications
Whether or not it is probable that in the case of the EU all buying countries receive a smaller allocation with a changing burden sharing rule can only be assumed. It might be possible for some countries which then would incur high losses. However, it is not possible to say, whether a certain member state will be in buying or selling country under the different schemes as future abatement costs are highly uncertain. However, the difference between maximum and minimum allocation is computable. Indeed it has already been presented in Table 5 which showed the ratio of the two figures. The lower the figure the higher the difference and thus the more likely a member state will be interested in getting a certain burden sharing rule.
For this a "relevance indicator" based on the minimum-maximum ratio is introduced. The indicator which is country-specific is determined as follows:
A value of one would mean that much is at stake while of value of 0 would mean that nothing is at stake as the different allocation rules result in the same allocation. As decision makers are unlikely to think in black and white only, a relevance threshold can be introduced. By so doing, one can determine the (number of) countries that are likely to be active during the negotiations with regard to a certain outcome (see Figure 3) . To give example, assume that member states only care about the allocation if the indicator is greater or equal than 0.8. In this case 21 MS care about the allocation rule. 27 This indicator may be relevant if politicians are guided during the negotiations by idea that they want to prove their electorate that they fought for the biggest allocation possible regardless of the economic importance. However, politicians may also keep the economic implications in mind. Referring to Table 7 , one can determine the threshold that has to be passed in order to make a certain number of MS interested in the final allocation rule (see Table 7 ). 27 The outcome depends on the period analysed. If emissions (entitlements) prior to 2013 are considered, too, the ratio is converging towards one. This can be explained by the fact that emissions (entitlements) in the first part are independent of the allocation from 2013. Dividing two increasing numbers that differ by the same absolute value gives a result converging to one. The rational of extending the period considered could be to reflect historic emission or contribution to climate change. Whether and to what extend past emissions should be referred to is a value judgement to be taken by political decision makers. During the negotiations of the first BSA it did not play a role (Ringius 1997, p. 41) . The discussion could, however, resume and thus influence the complexity of the negotiations. Depending on the negotiators' attitude assumed, one can get an idea on how negotiations will be. Assuming that they rather tent to fight in Brussels for a high allocation in order to get their voters' favour at home, negotiations will be difficult. Already for a threshold of 0.75, i.e. ¾ of the total scale, 19 member states will be active. In case the economic implications are also taken into account, the analysis is much more difficult as it depends on the carbon price assumed. However, to allow for a rough idea note that for example the indicative target for ODA is 0.7 % of GNI for industrialised countries. Though this figure does not seem very high, only very few states comply (OECD 2003) . Thus, with carbon price of 10 EUR/ t CO 2 negotiations may become complex as member states may feel that much is at stake.
In addition to that the new member states may ask for money and assistance when new commitments enter into force as Dessai et al. (2001, p. 331) report for the cohesion countries in the past. With regard to the EU financial system in an enlarged Community Hefeker (2003) argues that redistribution should be done as lump-sum transfer and not through the agriculture and social fond any more. This may also be considered in the context of climate policy.
Conclusion
Sharing the burden of limiting GHG emission to the atmosphere has been done between different countries in the past on both global and European level. It is likely to play a vital role in the future, too. Against this background three different options for allocating an EU-budget to its member states until 2042 have been analysed in the paper. The options studied are an allocation based on equal emissions per capita, on equal emissions per capita over time and based on the sovereignty principle. The three approaches result in considerably different allocations at least for single member states.
As the different allocations will influence the countries compliance costs they are likely to have (strong) negotiating positions in case this difference is large. To study this aspect in more detail a relevance factor has been introduced that describes from what ratio between minimum and maximum allocation MS care about the specific allocation rule. Assuming a rather high threshold, negotiations on a future burden sharing rule are likely to be complicated already with the limited number of allocation options discussed in this paper. Experienced and skilful negotiators may thus play a very important role in the future as they did in the past (Ringius 1997, p. 35) . In order to avoid this complex bargaining process an auction of emission entitlements on EU level may serve this problem. However, some other questions as for example the issue of revenue use would emerge.
Future work may include other burden sharing rules. An extension of the Triptych approach is a very interesting option. A more detailed analysis of the cost implications that takes more information on the member states' abatement costs into account is also desirable. 
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